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NOTES
STRICT LIABILITY IN FEDERAL COURTS:
PROBLEMS OF PREDICTING STATE
LAW UNDER ERIE
Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,' a federal
court deciding a diversity case must apply the substantive law that the
state in which it sits would apply. One problem left unanswered in
Erie involves the determination of state law in areas where the law is
changing or no state decisional law exists. 2 The Supreme Court has
held that in such cases the federal court must look to "all available
data" and, on that basis, decide the case as would the state's highest
court.3 In other words, the federal court must predict state law where,
in fact, none exists.
Recent developments in the area of products liability have brought
this problem to the fore.4 In deciding cases involving strict liability
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 The late Judge Clark, commenting on the situation posed where state law is con-
fused or non-existent, remarked that "this ... is the most troublesome, the most unsatis-
fying in its consequence" of the problems arising from the application of Erie. Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
YALE L.J. 267, 290 (1946).
3 West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). Although the West case
ultimately turned on the decision of an intermediate state appellate court, the standard
has been applied in cases where no state precedent existed. See IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcrxcE 0.039[2], at 8325 (2d ed. 1959).
4 The rapid advance of the doctrine of strict liability in products cases is without
parallel in the history of the law. Dean Prosser dates the beginning of this advance as
the famous case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69
(1960): "What has followed has been the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn
of an established rule in the entire history of the law of torts." Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rxv. 791, 793-94 (1966) (footnote
omitted).
The number of jurisdictions that have followed the New Jersey Supreme Court's
lead is difficult to determine. In 1966 Prosser was able to list 18 that had imposed a
rule of strict liability, without privity and without negligence, on manufacturers of all
products-Arizona, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington. Id. at 794-95. Since that time, at least 6 more
states have followed suit-Alaska, Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wiscon-
sin. Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969); State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967);
Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966); Webb v.
Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787
(Tex. 1967); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
Not all states have passed on the issue of strict liability. See I CCH PRoD. Lua. RE',
PREDICTING STATE LAW
claims, federal courts have often been confronted with a lack of state
precedent. They have been forced to predict state law on the basis of
an "Erie-educated guess"-often with the consequence of expanding
the manufacturer's liability.
Federal court decisions on products liability raise fundamental
problems under Erie. Although Erie provides no guidelines for de-
cision, important Erie policies may be violated in the process of ex-
tending liability.6 Federal decisions may affect the conduct of manu-
facturers dealing in state markets who rely upon these decisions. Given
the possibility of a contrary state court decision, such reliance may
be misplaced.7 Furthermore, forum-shopping may be encouraged if
federal courts extend liability." These problems suggest the need for a
new approach to predicting state law under Erie.
I
PROBLEMS OF PREDICTION
A. Federal Courts and the Privity Doctrine
The problem of predicting state law on products liability has
arisen most frequently on the issue of the privity doctrine. In the ab-
4060, at 4026-27 (1968). Some states have considered the doctrine only in terms -of food
products or products for intimate bodily use (id. at 4100); others have no decisional law
at all on strict liability (id. at 4060). More important, many state courts have not yet
ruled on important secondary issues of strict liability, such as economic loss (id. at 4230)
or recovery by innocent bystanders (id. at 4210).
5 As used in the text, the term "strict liability" includes both the theories of implied
warranty and strict tort. For a discussion of the similarities and differences, see Prosser,
supra note 4, at 800-05.
6 For a discussion of the Erie policies, see both the majority opinion and Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Some commentators have argued that the Erie doctrine does not apply to cases where
no state law exists. See Parker, Erie -. Tompkins in Retrospect: An Analysis of Its Proper
Area and Limits, 35 A.B.A.J. 19, 83 (1949).
7 One policy sought to be advanced by Erie was the promotion of predictability in
state law. This may be termed the "private ordering" policy. Erie attempted to eliminate
the situation where "[t]he result was to subject citizens at the crucial level of everyday
activity to dual and often inconsistent systems of substantive law, without means of fore-
telling which system, in the unforeseeable contingency of litigation, was going to apply."
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLuAr. L. Rav. 489, 505 (1954).
Federal decisions in products liability cases, by inducing private reliance on a federal
rule that may be rejected by the state courts, may create just such a dual and inconsistent
system of law. Although, on the surface, this situation is distinguishable from Erie-
where two rules of law existed side by side-the policy of effective "private ordering"
applies in each case.
8 The prevention of forum-shopping is a well-known Erie policy. For an example
of the problem, see Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276
U.S. 518 (1928).
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sence of state precedents, federal courts have uniformly rejected the
privity defense and imposed strict liability on the manufacturer for
personal injuries to the user or consumer.9 They have been aided in
this regard by trends in state law, both in products liability and in
other rapidly developing areas of the law.
In Putman v. Erie City Manufacturing Co.,10 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the privity doctrine and imposed strict li-
ability for personal injuries on the manufacturers of a wheelchair.
After concluding that no direct precedent for the claim existed in
Texas law, the court, in adopting section 402A of the Restatement
of Torts," rested its decision in part on a 1942 Texas food case.
12
9 E.g., Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965) (Indiana law);
Putrman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (Texas law); Deveny v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (Vermont law); Hughes v. Kaiser Jeep Corp., 40
F.R.D. 89 (D.S.C. 1966) (South Carolina law); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp.
427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (Indiana law); Crusan v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 250 F. Supp. 863
(E.D. Tex. 1965) (Texas law); Chairaluce v. Stanley Warner Mang. Corp., 236 F. Supp. 385
(D. Conn. 1964) (Connecticut law); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961),
aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (Hawaii law).
Where state precedent requires privity, federal courts ordinarily follow the state
rule. E.g., Schultz v. Tecumseh Prod. Co., 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962) (Kentucky law);
Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 243 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (Tennessee law);
Tomle v. New York Cent. R.R., 234 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (Ohio law); Barlow v.
DeVilbiss Co., 214 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1963) (Wisconsin law). The recent case of
Klimas v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937 (D.R.I. 1969), is a striking
exception. There the district court imposed strict liability on the manufacturer of a fuse
that exploded causing personal injuries to the plaintiff. Four years before, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, in Henry v. Eshelman & Sons, 99 R.I. 518, 209 A.2d 46 (1965), had
reaffirmed the privity doctrine and held that adoption of strict liability was for the state
legislature. In "overruling" Henry, the district court pointed to the abolition of the
forms of action in Rhode Island as the reason for its decision. Aside from the apparent
violation of the letter, as well as the spirit, of Erie, the Klimas case may indicate a new
trend toward judicial activism in federal products liability decisions.
30 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF ToRTs § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
12 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). The
court's reliance on Decker is questionable, since many states imposed strict liability without
privity on manufacturers of food long before the Henningsen decision. See Jaeger, Privity
of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. Rzv. 1, 63-90 (1963).
PREDICTING STATE LAW
Although the court considered law review commentary and cases from
other jurisdictions, it clearly indicated that the trend in Texas law
was a decisive factor.13
A similar approach was taken in Chapman v. Brown,14 where a
district court, sitting in Hawaii, imposed strict liability on the manu-
facturer of a hula skirt for personal injuries sustained when the skirt
caught fire. The court, again reviewing cases from other jurisdictions,
based its decision in part on the tendency of the Hawaiian courts, in
other areas of the law, to "adopt the enlightened view of extending
the remedy rather than restricting it."''1
Although trends within the state's law have been important,
federal courts have often given equal or greater consideration to cases
from other jurisdictions and to legal commentary. In Deveny v. Rheem
Manufacturing Co.,16 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, predicting
the law of Vermont, imposed strict warranty liability17 without priv-
ity on the manufacturers of a water heater and a component part for
personal injuries sustained when the heater exploded. In rejecting
the privity doctrine, the court relied solely on authorities from other
jurisdictions, 18 citing not a single Vermont case in support of strict
13 338 F.2d at 915-17, 923. The decision in Putman was foreshadowed in Siegel v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). There the district court in New
York, applying Texas law, rejected the privity doctrine in an action by the survivors of
the victims of an airplane crash. In adopting strict warranty liability, the district judge
stated that
[i]n view of the evident trend in the State of Texas and elsewhere, I am inclined
to conclude that the Supreme Court of Texas would not apply the requirement
of privity to the causes of action or claims which are attacked by this motion
[to dismiss].
Id. at 865. In Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. McKisson, 408 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), an
intermediate appellate court rejected the extension of Decker in a case involving a hair
preparation. After noting the Putman decision, the court stated:
Unlike the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ... this court is not in a position to
make "an Erie educated guess" and speculate whether the Texas Supreme Court
will extend the rule of the Decker case to nonfood cases. In our judgment it is
not proper for an intermediate appellate court to place Texas among those
"enlightened jurisdictions" which have applied strict liability without privity in
nonfood products liability cases.
Id. at 126.
On appeal, however, the federal court was vindicated. The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the appellate court and imposed strict liability without privity,
citing, inter alia, Putman. Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. McKisson, 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
14 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
15 Id. at 111 (emphasis in original).
16 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963).
17 See note 5 supra.
18 The court did cite several Vermont cases on the separate issues of negligence and
res ipsa loquitur. 319 F.2d at 129. It did not refer to these cases, however, in treating the
independent warranty claim.
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liability.") Similarly, in Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co.,20 a district
court in Indiana imposed strict liability on the manufacturer of a fork-
lift truck. After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, including
the Putman case, the court adopted section 402A as the law of Indiana,
concluding that "[t]he direction of the law is clear."
2' 1
B. Related Issues of Strict Liability
More serious problems have faced federal courts in predicting
state law on related issues of products liability. Such issues involve
refinements of liability in personal injury cases or an extension of the
protection of the doctrine to different parties or interests; examples
are liability of the manufacturer for economic loss, application of strict
liability to inherently dangerous products, recovery by innocent by-
standers, and the manufacturer's duty in the design of products.
22
On these issues there often is no clear trend of the law, either within
the state or in other jurisdictions. The case law is generally undevel-
oped and, because of the complexity of the issues, there is little accord
among either courts or commentators. As a result, the Erie problems
of predicting state law are compounded, and the federal courts, in the
absence of state precedent, have hesitated to extend the manufacturer's
liability into new areas.
23
19 Speaking for the court, Judge Clark argued that the court's duty was
not to surmise which line of judicial precedent a Vermont court would fol-
low .... but rather, by looking to the same sources which a Vermont court
would presumably consult and by weighing the comparative reasoning of learned
authors and conflicting judicial decisions for their intrinsic soundness, to define
the pertinent law which when thus ascertained is presumably the law of Ver-
mont ....
Id. at 129-30, quoting Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 219 F.2d 645, 647
(2d Cir. 1955).
Judge Clark was never ranked among the friends of Erie. See Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 384 n.1l (1964). Clark
argued for a more flexible approach to Erie in cases where no precedent existed, allowing
federal judges to exercise the "judicial functions." Clark, supra note 2, at 290-95.
20 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
21 Id. at 432.
22 For a discussion of these issues, see Prosser, supra note 4, at 800-40.
23 One major difficulty arising from such issues is that of formulating a rule. Where
privity has been at issue, federal courts have been presented with a ready-made rule-
§ 402A of the Restatement. This is not the case with other issues such as refinements in
liability or the scope of damages recoverable. Federal and subsequent state formulations,
therefore, could differ. For example, in deciding a case involving an inherently dan-
gerous drug, two rules may result, both imposing liability without privity. The federal
court may find liability for any defect in the drug, whether known or unknown. The
state-also extending liability-may require knowledge and impose only a duty to warn.
Cf. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). A similar problem
arises on the economic-loss issue. See text at notes 37-42 infra.
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Federal courts that have predicted liability on the privity issue
for personal injuries have declined to extend liability on other issues
without clear state precedent. In Evans v. General Motors Corp.,
24
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the issue of
whether, under Indiana law, an automobile manufacturer was under
a duty to so design its product as to protect against collisions not
caused by a design defect. No case, in Indiana or in any other juris-
diction, dealt with the issue directly. Although the same court had
adopted section 402A as the-law of Indiana after the Greeno decision,25
it refused to extend liability in Evans. Speaking for the court, Judge
Knoch advocated judicial restraint: "Perhaps it would be desirable to
require manufacturers to construct automobiles in which it would
be safe to collide, but that would be a legislative function, not an aspect
of judicial interpretation of existing law."26 Although the Evans court
did not elaborate, it undoubtedly realized that an imposition of novel
liability would have had a substantial impact on automobile manu-
facturers' production standards.2 7 The possibility of a contrary state
court decision or legislative enactment made the court unwilling to
predict liability for such design defects.
A similar problem has been presented in cases involving inher-
ently dangerous products, where the issue of the manufacturer's li-
ability has generated much debate among courts and commentators
but no clear consensus has emerged.28 In Green v. American Tobacco
Co.,29 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the issue
24 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
25 Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965).
26 359 F.2d at 824 (emphasis added). The decision in Evans was subsequently fol-
lowed in Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), and Shumard v.
General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967). In Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), the court held an automobile manufacturer liable for
negligence in design while, at the same time, rejecting a claim based on the theory of
strict tort. The court stated that "[t]he doctrine of strict liability is one of policy for the
states and the National Congress, and we do not think there has been a sufficient showing on
the Michigan law as respects this point, particularly in the automotive field." Id. at 506.
27 Liability was found in the recent case of Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.
Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969). There the district court, applying Pennsylvania law, held the
automobile manufacturer strictly liable for personal injuries sustained when the roof of
the car collapsed during the course of an accident. Finding no direct precedent in
Pennsylvania, the court based its decision on trends in state products liability law, hold-
ing that the state courts were "in the forefront of liberally construing and applying the
principles of Section 402A of the Restatement." Id. at 1070.
28 See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Re-
quirement of a Defect, 41 TExAs L. REv. 855 (1963).
29 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), certified question to 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), con-
formed to, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
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of whether a cigarette manufacturer could be held strictly liable for
death resulting from lung cancer. Although the state courts had abol-
ished privity and adopted strict liability in other cases,80 as in Putman,
the court found no direct precedent for the claim in Florida law.31
Unlike Putman, however, the court refused to predict state law on
the issue. Instead, a certified question was submitted to the state court
under a rule of Florida procedure.32 One year later in Lartigue v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.,33 the same court predicted that Louisiana law
would deny liability.
Clearly, an extension of liability in either Green or Lartigue would
have had a great impact on cigarette manufacturers.34 Perhaps more
important, victims of cigarette smoking would have been encouraged
to sue in federal courts. Again, although it did not explain its de-
cision, these considerations apparently made the court unwilling to
extend liability in the absence of a clear state precedent or a clear
trend of products liability decisions in other jurisdictions.
II
STRICr LIABILITY AND THE Erie POLICIES
Where the trend of products liability law has been clear, federal
courts lacking state precedents have adopted the modem rule of strict li-
ability without privity in cases of personal injury to the user or consumer.
Few Erie problems arise here. A federal court decision establishing
30 Matthews v. Lawnite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956); Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc.,
137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. V. E.C.
"Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
31 Originally, the court had sustained a jury verdict for the defendant. On rehearing,
it determined that there was no precedent for the claim. 804 F.2d at 86.
32 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (Supp. 1969). The certified question submitted to the
Florida Supreme Court did not settle the issue in the case. Rather than asking whether
the defendant could be held strictly liable for an inherent defect that could not be
eliminated, the Fifth Circuit asked only whether the defendant must have had knowledge
of the defect at the time of sale. The Florida Supreme Court answered the latter question
in the negative, but did not answer the former, and crucial, question. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.
1963), conformed to, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
38 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Ross v. Philip Morris 8: Co., 328 F.2d 8 (8th
Cir. 1964); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). Only
in Pritchard-the initial case-did the federal court extend liability.
34 Unlike Evans, an extension of liability in Green or Lartigue would probably not
have affected production standards. By definition, inherently dangerous defects are those
which, given the current state of human knowledge, may not be eliminated. However,
liability would have affected the manufacturer's conduct in other ways-for example, re-
quiring the purchase of insurance or the raising of prices, with consequent loss in sales.
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strict liability for personal injuries where state law is silent has little
effect on outside reliance-that is, on the "private ordering" of the
manufacturer. 35 Given the abolition of the privity requirement in over
twenty jurisdictions, 8 a federal decision is not likely to affect the be-
havior of a large manufacturer dealing in a national market. The manu-
facturer is likely to have anticipated the consequences of the obvious
national trend by, for example, purchasing insurance covering liability
for personal injuries and perhaps property damage caused by defective
products. In other words, it is not the federal rule on which the manu-
facturer relies. Similarly, although forum-shopping is encouraged by
an extension of liability, the likelihood of a state court decision up-
holding the privity defense in a subsequent personal injury case is
slight. Thus, although the Putman and Chapman cases, which em-
phasized the trend within the particular state, are closer in spirit to
Erie than is Deveny, which relied on a national trend, none of these
cases seriously undermines the policies of Erie.
Where the trend of products liability law is unclear, however,
serious Erie problems arise. Liability for economic loss is a good ex-
ample; 37 the few state courts that have considered the issue are di-
vided,38 and legal commentators generally are not in agreement.8 9
35 Note 7 supra.
38 Note 4 supra.
37 See generally Prosser, supra note 4, at 820-23; Note, Economic Loss in Products
Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 912 (1966).
Only one federal court has considered the manufacturer's liability for business losses
sustained by the purchaser of a defective product, and there state precedent existed
denying recovery. Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
In Atlas, the purchaser of an adhesive brought an action against the manufacturer
for property damage and lost profits resulting from the adhesive's failure to hold glass
in window frames. Although it rejected the implied warranty claim, the district court
upheld a negligence claim.
38 The two leading cases on the economic-loss issue are Santor v. A. & M. Karagheu-
sian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), and Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403
P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). In Santor, the New Jersey Supreme Court held a rug
manufacturer strictly liable to the consumer for economic loss sustained when the rug
developed several lines down its length. The purchaser was allowed to recover his loss-of-
bargain damages on the basis of both implied warranty and strict tort. In Seely, the
California Supreme Court, in dicta, rejected a recovery of business losses by the purchaser
on the strict tort theory. The purchaser was allowed to recover, however, on the theory
of express warranty.
That the two most progressive tort-law jurisdictions have reached contrary condu-
sions on this issue indicates its complexity. For decisions in other states, see Continental
Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1958). Contra, Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc.,
55 Wash. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960).
19701
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Several issues are presented here. Does the doctrine of strict liability
protect the economic as well as the personal and property interests
.of the purchaser?40 Should the manufacturer be liable for both direct
and consequential damages-that is, for both the purchaser's loss of
bargain and for lost profits? Should the manufacturer be allowed to
disclaim liability for economic loss?41 Resolution of these issues depends
on important considerations of state policy-particularly the possibility
of economic disruption and the availability of insurance.42
A federal court that extends liability in these circumstances has no
assurance that a state court will also do so. Faced with possible liability
for economic loss if taken into federal court, the manufacturer will
rely on the federal court's decision by purchasing additional insurance,
greater in amount and broader in coverage. In the absence of a fed-
eral decision in favor of liability, additional insurance is unnecessary.
With the possibility of a subsequent contrary state court decision,
reliance on the federal decision may be misplaced.43 Extending liability
in these circumstances will also encourage forum-shopping by plain-
tiffs, since, if a decision in the state court can go either way, plaintiffs
will always choose the federal forum.
CoNcLUSION
In areas of product liability where state precedent provides few
guidelines for an "Erie-educated guess," two avenues are open to a
39 Prosser argues that consequential economic loss-lost profits-should be compen-
sated, but not direct economic loss-loss of bargain. He reasons that the latter is more a
matter of bargaining between the purchaser and the dealer than of a manufacturer's
responsibility to the purchaser. Prosser, supra note 4, at 821-23. The reasoning of student
commentators, based on an insurability argument, appears to point to an opposite con-
dusion. Note, supra note 37, at 954-58.
40 Courts have traditionally hesitated to give protection to economic interests, even
in negligence cases. See Note, supra note 37, at 943-50.
41 Refusal to recognize a disclaimer may conflict with UNIFORM Co-rsMIcIAL CODE
§ 2-316. See Note, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss"
Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. Ruv. 539, 546 (1966).
42 See Note, supra note 37, at 955-58.
43 The possible cost of such misplaced reliance may be considerable. Consider a small
manufacturer of a component part. Under existing law, he may be able to shift the
risk of economic loss down the distributive chain by a disclaimer of warranty. If a federal
court decision removed this right on a strict tort theory, economic disaster could follow.
The small manufacturer could neither obtain adequate insurance, nor absorb potential
loss, under the theories of "deep-pocket" or "risk-spreading." Given this possibility, there
is little comfort to such a manufacturer that in the future a state court may overrule the
federal decision. The damage will already have been done.
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federal court. It may refuse to extend liability into new axeas. This
approach, adopted in Evans, treats a lack of state precedent as a denial
of liability by the state courts. 4 It avoids the problems of misplaced
reliance and forum-shopping involved in the prediction of novel li-
ability,45 but it deprives the parties of a determination on the merits.
Another approach, suggested by the Green decision, is to expand
the abstention doctrine that enables a federal court to retain juris-
diction over the case while it refuses to determine a question of state
law.40 The Supreme Court has recognized federal court abstention in
diversity cases where unclear questions of state public law have been
raised.47 This recognition may be extended to important issues of
private law, such as products liability, where a federal determination
of state law would impair "some recognized public policy or defined
principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred."
48
As in Green, the certified question procedure provides an effective
means of abstention. At the present time, at least five states, either by
statute or court rule, recognize such a procedure.49 In those states where
certified questions are permitted, federal courts may, after making find-
44 An example is Davidson v. Leadingham, 294 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ky. 1968). There
the occupants of an automobile involved in a collision with a truck brought an action
in strict tort against the manufacturer of the truck. Finding no precedent in Kentucky
law for recovery by an innocent bystander, neither a "user" nor "consumer" within the
terms of § 402A, the district court denied liability, holding that absent a "dear and
persuasive" statement by the state courts, such liability did not exist in state law. Id. at
158. See also Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
45 An adjudication of no liability may lead to a form of reverse forum-shopping-
that is, forum-shopping by defendants who seek to remove cases from state to federal
courts. This is not as serious a problem as forum-shopping by plaintiffs, however, since it
is possible only where all of the defendants are nonresidents. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
In the ordinary products liability case, the local retailer-a citizen of the forum state-
is joined as a defendant. Removal to a federal court is impossible in such a case.
46 For a discussion of this and other types of abstention, see Note, Abstention and
Certification in Diversity Suits, "'Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE
L.J. 850 (1964), suggesting certification by federal courts.
47 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). In Thibo-
daux, the Supreme Court allowed abstention where an uninterpreted state statute was
involved in eminent domain proceedings. The district court had ordered a stay in the
proceedings and requested the parties to seek a declaratory judgment in the state courts
on the question of law.
48 Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 US. 228, 234 (1943). Although Meredith
contained dicta to the effect that abstention be exercised only in equity, this view was
repudiated in Thibodaux. 360 U.S, at 28.
49 F1. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (Supp. 1969); HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 602-36 (1968); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 7 (Supp. 1968); WAsiI. RaV. CODE ANN. § 2.60.020 (Supp. 1968);




ings of fact, submit unresolved questions' of products liability law to the
highest state court, and thus avoid an uncertain prediction of-state
law. This procedure is a speedy and inexpensive method of determining
state law that preserves the federal forum for fact-finding. Moreover,
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings have re-
cently proposed an act that provides for the use of certified questions
by both federal appellate and district courts.50 As the Commissioners'
proposal is adopted by state legislatures, this method of determining
products liability law should become increasingly important. 1
Charles F. Rechlin
00 Section 1. [Power to Answer.] The [Supreme Court] may answer questions of
law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals
of the United States, a United States District Court [or the highest appellate
court or the intermediate appellate court of any other state], when requested by
the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions
of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in
the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is
no controlling precedent in the decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the in-
termediate appellate courts] of this state.
UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUEsTIONS OF LAW [ACr] [RuLE] § 1 (1967 Draft) [brackets
in the original].
51 The recently proposed amendments to title 28 adopted by the American Law Insti-
tute specifically provide for certified questions to state courts. The proposed § 1371(e)
provides:
A court of the United States may certify to the highest court of a State a
question of State Law, if (1) the State has established a procedure by which its
highest court may answer questions certified from such court of the United States;
(2) the question of State law may be controlling in the action and cannot be satis-
factorily determined in the light of State authorities; and (3) the court expressly
finds that certification will not cause undue delay or be prejudicial to the parties.
ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JUISDICrION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 50 (1968
Draft). Although the proposed § 1371(e) appears, on its face, to allow certification of
important questions of private law as well as public law, the comments leave this in
doubt. Id. at 296-97. Several questions concerning the certified question procedure remain
unanswered. One involves the problem that may arise when the law to be determined
is that of a non-forum state. It appears that personal jurisdiction of the defendant would
not be required in the non-forum state. Because the state court would not be deciding
the case, but merely determining an issue of law, the parties could submit briefs and
make oral arguments without personal jurisdiction. UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
oF LAw [ACT] [RULE] § 6 (1967 Draft).
A related problem involves the validity of the procedure under state constitutional
provisions prohibiting advisory opinions. A recent case has held that the answers to
certified questions are not advisory opinions where there are adversary parties, all fact
issues have been determined, and the issues of law are determinative of the case. In re
Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
Finally, a question arises as to the force of state court answers as precedent. Because
the answering court does not decide the case, its answers may be considered dicta; but
such answers are dearly preferable to unfounded federal court prediction of state law.
